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Group-based angerIn three studies we examined whether the anticipation of group-based guilt, shame and anger predicts the
desire to undertake collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression. In Studies 1 (N=179) and
2 (N=186), the relation between appraising a proposed ingroup transgression as illegitimate and collective
action was mediated (or partially mediated) by anticipated group-based shame and anger. In Study 3 (N=
128) participants with high self-investment group identiﬁcation were less willing to engage in collective
action against the prospective ingroup transgression when aversive anticipated group-based emotions
were made salient. This effect was mediated by anticipated group-based shame. We discuss the implications
of these results with regard to collective action and the morality of intergroup behavior.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license. Introduction
In 2002, the then President of the United States (George W. Bush)
and the then Prime Minister of Great Britain (Tony Blair) announced
that American and British troops were going to be deployed in Iraq to
search for weapons of mass destruction and to free the Iraqi people.
This announcement led to large-scale protests in Britain and the United
States. On 15th February 2003, between 750,000 (police estimate) and
2 million (organizers' estimate) protesters gathered on the streets of
London to show their opposition to the war, creating the largest protest
in the city's history. On the sameday between 100,000 (police estimate)
and 375,000 (organizers' estimate) people gathered on the streets of
New York to protest against the invasion. Despite these protests by
British and American citizens, the invasion of Iraq commenced on
19th March 2003. The current research addresses the question of why
people are motivated to act collectively against aversive events thatl Sciences, University of Stirling,
d).
nse. look possible but have not yet happened, and the role of (anticipated)
group emotions in this process.
A growing body of research has found that morality is a key aspect
of social identity (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; Leach,
Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Scheepers, Spears, Manstead, & Doosje,
2009). In this article we develop this work by outlining a self-
regulatory process that helps ingroup members to maintain a moral
group identity. We argue that aversive anticipated group-based emo-
tions (e.g., shame and anger) promote moral intergroup behavior by
signaling the harmful emotional consequences of a proposed ingroup
transgression. The desire to avoid these aversive emotions motivates
ingroup members to prevent the transgression from occurring. One
strategy thatmay alter the intended behavior of one's group is collective
action. We therefore extend the intergroup and collective action litera-
ture by arguing that the mere anticipation of an aversive group-
based emotion is sufﬁcient to motivate group members (i.e., British
and American citizens) to undertake collective action against a pro-
posed ingroup transgression, such as the use of military force against
Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program. This hypothesis was tested in
three studies.
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People may experience guilt, shame and anger in relation to the
actions or attributes of their own group simply through their association
with the ingroup, even in the absence of personal responsibility for these
actions or attributes (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Doosje, Branscombe,
Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006). These
group-based emotions are felt when people appraise their group as
responsible for an illegitimate negative act (Branscombe, Doosje, &
McGarty, 2002; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Leach, Snider, & Iyer,
2002). The exact appraisal of the illegitimate action determines which
emotion(s) will be evoked.
People are likely to experience group-based guilt when they believe
that their groupwas responsible for an illegitimate action (Branscombe
et al., 2002; Doosje et al., 1998). Guilt is regarded as a self-focused emo-
tion because people focus on their illegitimate act and the negative
affect that they are currently experiencing (Harth, Kessler, & Leach,
2008; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Leach et al., 2002; Roseman, Wiest,
& Swartz, 1994). Moreover, because guilt is associated with low levels
of physical arousal and action readiness (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure,
1989; Roseman et al., 1994) it may also be regarded as a relatively
passive emotion (Iyer et al., 2003; Leach et al., 2002, 2006).
Although researchers have debated whether shame maybe derived
from actions implying a global (e.g., Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski,
1994; Tangney, 1991; Tracy & Robins, 2006) or speciﬁc lapse of identity
and reputation (e.g., Gausel & Leach, 2011), there is consensus that, in
contrast to guilt, the focus is on the self rather than the behavior
(Allpress, Barlow, Brown, & Louis, 2010; Ferguson, Burgman, White, &
Eyre, 2007; Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1992). Shame is therefore likely to
be felt when people believe that a transgression tarnishes their image
(Ferguson, 2005; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Similarly, intergroup
research has found that group-based shame is likely to be elicited
when people believe that an ingroup action tarnishes social identity
(Iyer et al., 2007; Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005;
Lickel, Schmader, & Spanovic, 2007).
Group-based anger is typically felt towards outgroups who have
harmed the ingroup (Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006;
Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004; Van Zomeren, Spears, &
Leach, 2008; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). However,
people can also feel angry at their own group when they believe that
the ingroup is responsible for harming an outgroup (Iyer et al., 2003;
Leach et al., 2006); whereas guilt is a self-focused emotion, ingroup-
directed anger is an other-focused emotion that is felt when people
are concerned with the effect of the ingroup's actions on the victimized
outgroup. Moreover, in contrast to guilt, anger is associated with a high
level of arousal and action readiness (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al.,
1994).
Returning to the Iraq example, some sections of the media
suggested that the invasion of Iraq was a ‘front’ for gaining access to
the country's oil resources. If the war was thought to be driven by
this motivation, the future actions of the ingroup would have likely
been appraised as illegitimate. British and American citizens are likely
to experience group-based shame when they believe that this action
highlights a self-defect that tarnishes their moral identity, guilt
when they focus on their group's perceived illegitimate action and its
aversive affective consequences, and anger when they believe that the
invasion was an avoidable injustice against Iraqi people and focus on
the negative consequences of this action for this outgroup.
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) postulates that
ingroup members are motivated to maintain a positive social identity.
All three of the above group-based emotions threaten social identity by
associating the ingroup with a transgression (Branscombe, Ellemers,
Spears, & Doosje, 1999). However, because a self-defect is more damag-
ing than perceiving a single action to be illegitimate, group-based shame
poses a greater threat to social identity than does anger or guilt. In
contrast to guilt and anger, group-based shame is likely to be evokedwhen social identity is tarnished (Iyer et al., 2007; Lickel et al., 2005)
and predicts the desire to repair the ingroup's image (Johns, Schmader,
& Lickel, 2005; Schmader & Lickel, 2006).
Each of these group-based emotions is associated with a different
action tendency. Group-based guilt is associatedwith the desire to com-
pensate the victimized outgroup (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Doosje et al.,
1998). However, the low action potential and self-reﬂective nature of
this emotion are likely to be insufﬁcient to promote the kinds of effortful
behaviors that may resolve the situation, such as collective action (Iyer
et al., 2003; Leach et al., 2006). By contrast, the high activation associat-
ed with anger motivates group members to undertake collective action
in order to resolve the injustice (Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, &
Bruder, 2009;VanZomeren et al., 2004, 2008), evenwhen the transgres-
sion was performed by the ingroup (Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006).
Shame elicits actions that serve to repair social identity. A traditional
account of shame suggests that it promotes self-defensive action
tendencies, such as social withdrawal and the externalization of
blame (Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, & McCloskey, 2010; Tangney,
Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). However, recent research has
found that shame can also promote prosocial behaviors that serve to
repair one's identity (De Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; De
Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010; Gausel & Leach, 2011; but
see Allpress et al., 2010), such as reparations (Brown & Cehajic, 2008;
Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008). People may also
try to repair social identity through collective action. For example, Iyer
et al. (2007) found that group-based shame positively predicted British
and American people's willingness to undertake collective action
supporting a withdrawal of allied forces from Iraq. Although Iyer et al.
(2007) suggest that this was a form of distancing, we argue that such
action may also reﬂect the desire to stop a current transgression
(e.g., the “Not in Our Name” campaign). Our argument is supported
by the fact that Iyer et al. (2007) found that emotions that are not
typically associated with social distancing (i.e., group-based anger)
also predicted this form of collective action.
Given evidence that British and American people were motivated
to protest against the invasion of Iraq when they experience
group-based shame and anger (Iyer et al., 2007), it seems reasonable
to assume that such group-based emotions may have motivated British
and American people to take part in the protests on 15th February.
However, the protests took place a month before allied forces invaded
Iraq, so it seems unlikely that these emotions would have been experi-
enced directly or as a direct result of these events. At the time of the
protests the ingroup had not as yet committed any transgressions that
might provide the basis for these emotions. We argue that appraising
the future behavior of the ingroup as illegitimate might have led people
to anticipate feeling group-based guilt, shame and anger were their
country to invade Iraq, and that the desire to avoid these aversive
events and their related emotions motivated people to protest against
the invasion. We therefore extend the collective action literature by
arguing that the mere anticipation of aversive group-based emotions
is sufﬁcient to promote collective action.
It is possible that people directly experienced group-based anger
and shame at the fact that their leaders were even considering whether
to undertake a transgression. However, in line with Baumeister, Vohs,
DeWall, and Zhang (2007) we argue that these directly experienced
emotions are likely to promote behavior by signaling the anticipated
emotion consequences of this transgression (‘If we are angry that our
leaders are even considering this action, we will be furious if they actu-
ally undertake it’). We therefore argue that in such circumstances the
anticipation of aversive group-based emotions is likely to promote
collective action against an impending transgression.
The effect of anticipated emotions on moral conduct
Despite widespread evidence for ingroup bias, recent research
suggests that group members are motivated to see their behavior as
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Leach et al., 2007; Scheepers et al., 2009). At the interpersonal level,
Bandura (1986, 1991, 2001) argues that the anticipation of positive
and negative self-sanctions serves the self-regulatory function of pro-
moting moral conduct. People are likely to anticipate positive affec-
tive rewards (such as self-respect) for undertaking moral actions
and negative affective reactions (such as self-contempt) for immoral
behavior. The desire to experience positive and avoid negative arousal
promotes moral conduct. This approach has been elaborated by subse-
quent theories (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt,
2001), who argue that the anticipation of moral self-conscious emo-
tions promotes ethical behavior. Moral self-conscious emotions can be
deﬁned as emotions that are associated with the evaluation of the
morality of the self (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). People are
likely to experience aversive moral self-conscious emotions (such as
guilt and shame) when they violate a moral standard (Tangney &
Dearing, 2002). Similarly, people may anticipate experiencing these
emotions when they believe that a future action would violate a
moral standard (Manstead, 2000). The desire to avoid these aversive
self-critical emotions motivates people to inhibit immoral behaviors.
For example, research has found that anticipated regret, guilt and
shame increases condom use (Hynie, MacDonald, & Marques, 2006;
Richard, Van der Pligt, & De Vries, 1996; Traeen & Kvalem, 2007) and
deters deviant behavior (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Rebellon, Piquero,
Piquero, & Tibbetts, 2010; Tibbetts, 1997). We extend this literature
by stating that people may anticipate group-based emotions for future
ingroup actions and that the desire to avoid aversive anticipated
group-based emotions promotes moral intergroup behavior.
Group-based emotions
Intergroup emotion theory (Smith, 1993) argues that group-based
emotions are experienced when people categorize themselves as
ingroup members and perceive the intergroup situation in a way
that is consistent with an emotional appraisal. As mentioned earlier,
categorizing oneself as an ingroupmember and appraising the actions
of this group as illegitimate is likely to elicit group-based guilt, shame
and anger (Branscombe et al., 2002; Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al.,
2006; Lickel et al., 2005). We extend intergroup emotion theory by
arguing that anticipated group-based guilt, shame and anger are
evoked when people categorize themselves as ingroup members
and appraise a future ingroup action (e.g., a military intervention
against Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program) as illegitimate.
Group-based shame, guilt and anger are aversive, as demonstrated
by the numerous ‘identity management strategies’ (Ellemers, Wilke,
& Van Knippenberg, 1993; Van Knippenberg, 1989) that people use
to avoid them (for an overview, see Branscombe &Miron, 2004). Gen-
erally, the intergroup literature has focused on the implementation of
these strategies after the event has taken place. However, people may
also implement identity management strategies (such as legitimization
and dehumanization) before an event takes place (Bar-Tal, 1990; Staub,
1989).We extend this literature by arguing that peoplemay also imple-
ment pro-social identity management strategies in an anticipatory
fashion. One such strategy involves attempts to stop the transgression
from happening in the ﬁrst place. When people predict (or anticipate)
that the future actions of their group would result in them feeling
aversive group-based emotions, they should be motivated to try to
stop the transgression from occurring. Collective action is one strategy
for changing the intended behavior of the ingroup. Thus if people
(e.g., British and American citizens) appraise a proposed ingroup action
(e.g., the use of military force against Iran's alleged nuclear weapons
program) as illegitimate, they may well anticipate feeling group-based
guilt, shame and anger arising from this transgression. The anticipation
of these aversive group-based emotions may motivate ingroup mem-
bers to protest against their group's plans (‘Not in Our Name’). The
aim of such protest would be to prevent the ingroup from committinga transgression, thereby avoiding the aversive emotions and the threat
posed to social identity.
There is a well-established literature on the role of emotions in reg-
ulating intergroup behavior (e.g., Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones,
2007; Devine, Plant, & Buswell, 2000; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006,
2007). We extend this literature by suggesting that anticipated group-
based emotions also serve a self-regulatory function. In keeping with
Baumeister et al. (2007), we suggest that the anticipation of aversive
group-based emotions act to deter immoral intergroup behavior.
Some anticipated group-based emotions should be stronger predic-
tors of collective action than others. We argue that the desire to avoid
the social identity threat signaled by anticipated group-based shame
and the high level of agitated arousal that is anger should motivate
group members to undertake collective action against a proposed
ingroup transgression. By contrast, the relatively low level of agitation
that is anticipated group-based guilt may be insufﬁcient to motivate
people to undertake effortful action tendencies (such as collective
action) and may instead promote less effortful action tendencies, such
as reparation (Iyer et al., 2003; Leach et al., 2006). We tested these
hypotheses in Study 1.
Study 1
The aim of Study 1 was to assess whether appraising a future
ingroup action as illegitimate would elicit anticipated group-based
guilt, shame and anger, and whether these emotions would promote
collective action against the impending transgression. Participants
were informed that the ingroup (the English) was planning to charge
students from an outgroup (the Welsh) additional tuition fees for
studying at an English university. The future-oriented nature of an
illegitimate action in this situation had the potential to elicit the
anticipated group-based emotions. We hypothesized that illegitimacy
would positively predict anticipated group-based guilt, shame and
anger, and that the latter two emotionswould, in turn, predict collective
action against the proposed ingroup transgression.
Method
Participants
A total of 179 undergraduate and postgraduate students fromCardiff
University (29 men and 150 women) participated in this research in
exchange for course credit or £1 (approximately $1.60). Their ages
ranged from 18 to 38 years, with a mean age of 20.15. All participants
were English nationals.
Materials
Illegitimacy appraisal. Three items were used to assess illegitimacy: ‘It
would be wrong for the English to charge extra tuition fees to the
Welsh,’ ‘It would be immoral for the English to act in this way,’ and
‘It would be morally unacceptable for the English to treat the Welsh
like this’ (α=.91). These items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree).
Anticipated group-based emotions. Three anticipated group-based
emotions were measured: guilt, shame and anger. The guilt and
shame items were adapted from Lickel et al. (2005). The guilt items
were ‘guilty,’ ‘regret,’ and ‘remorse’ (α=.85). The shame items were
‘ashamed,’ ‘uncomfortable,’ and ‘embarrassed’ (α=.89). Anger was
assessed using the following items: ‘angry,’ ‘annoyed,’ and ‘outraged’
(α=.92). Participants were asked: ‘If the English were to charge the
Welsh an extra £1250 tuition fees for studying in England, to what
extent would you feel [emotion word]?’ Participants responded to
these items on 7-point scales (0=not at all, 6=extremely).
Table 1
Conﬁrmatory factor analysis ﬁt indices for the anticipated group-based emotions (Study 1).
Fit indices Model comparison
with three-factor
solution
χ2 df GFI CFI NFI RMSEA AIC Δχ² df
Three-factor model 35.43† 24 .96 .99 .97 .053 77.43
Two-factor combined guilt and shame model 48.74⁎⁎ 26 .94 .98 .96 .072 86.74 13.31⁎⁎ 2
Two-factor combined shame and anger model 114.95⁎⁎⁎ 26 .83 .92 .90 .142 152.95 79.52⁎⁎⁎ 2
Two-factor combined guilt and anger model 124.81⁎⁎⁎ 26 .83 .91 .90 .150 162.81 89.38⁎⁎⁎ 2
Single-factor model 141.71⁎⁎⁎ 27 .80 .90 .88 .159 177.71 106.28⁎⁎⁎ 3
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et al. (2004) to assess the participant's intentions to perform collective
action: ‘I would like to participate in a demonstration against this
proposal,’ ‘I would like to participate in raising our collective voice to
stop this proposal,’ and ‘I would like to do somethingwith other English
people to stop this proposal’ (α=.93). Participants rated the extent to
which they endorsed these items on a 7-point scale (1=not at all,
7=extremely).
Procedure
The study was completed online. After consent had been given, par-
ticipants read a report stating that universities were suffering from a
lack of funding, which could have serious consequences for the stan-
dard of teaching. One solution that was being considered by the UK
government (in England) was to raise tuition fees for non-English stu-
dents studying at English universities. However, this would mean that
if non-English UK students, such as theWelsh,were to study in England
they would be expected to pay more for their education than their
English counterparts. To ensure that this discrimination was perceived
as illegitimate, participants were informed that theWelsh Government
was not planning to introduce proposals to increase tuition fees paid by
English students studying inWales. This information was followed by a
series of multiple-choice comprehension questions. Participants then
completed the illegitimacy, anticipated group-based emotion and
collective action measures.
Results
Nine participants answered more than half of the comprehension
questions incorrectly. Removing these participants from the data did
not alter the results in any substantive way, so their data were retained.
A logarithmic transformation was performed on the illegitimacy vari-
able prior to further analysis to correct for moderate negative skew.
Conﬁrmatory factor analysis
We conducted a conﬁrmatory factor analysis to determine the
construct validity of the anticipated group-based emotions and hypoth-
esized that anticipated group-based shame, guilt and anger would beTable 2
Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations between variables (Study 1).
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5
1. Illegitimacy appraisal 1.53 (0.25) –
2. Anticipated group-based guilt 2.68 (1.51) .47⁎⁎⁎ –
3. Anticipated group-based shame 3.24 (1.69) .57⁎⁎⁎ .81⁎⁎⁎ –
4. Anticipated group-based anger 2.94 (1.66) .58⁎⁎⁎ .69⁎⁎⁎ .78⁎⁎⁎ –
5. Collective action 2.98 (1.45) .49⁎⁎⁎ .55⁎⁎⁎ .67⁎⁎⁎ .65⁎⁎⁎ –
Note. Table contains transformed illegitimacy appraisal variable.
⁎⁎⁎ pb .001.three distinct constructs. This three-factor solution was contrasted
with a single-factor solution and three two-factor solutions. The three-
factor solution provided a signiﬁcantly better ﬁt with the data than
these alternative solutions (see Table 1), conﬁrming that anticipated
guilt, shame and anger were indeed separate constructs.
Multicollinearity
Because the correlations between the three negative anticipated
emotions were high (see Table 2), we calculated the tolerance and
variance inﬂation factors (VIF) to determine whether our dataset was
biased by multicollinearity (i.e. tolerance values less than .20; Cohen,
Cohen,West, & Aiken, 2003; Menard, 1995). Similarly, VIF values great-
er than 10 suggest a multicollinearity issue (Myers, 1990). When the
illegitimacy and anticipated emotionswere entered into a single regres-
sion analysis the tolerance values ranged from .25 to .66 and the VIF
values ranged from 1.52 to 3.93, suggesting that the dataset was not
affected by multicollinearity.
Structural equation modeling
Hypothesized model. Based on the above rationale, we hypothesized
that appraising the situation as illegitimate would positively predict
guilt, shame and anger, and that the latter two emotions would posi-
tively predict collective action. This model was assessed using AMOS
19 software (Arbuckle, 2010). The model tests were based on the
covariance matrix and maximum likelihood estimation was used. The
chi-squared value was non-signiﬁcant, χ2(1, N=179)=2.07, p=
.150, suggesting that the ﬁt between the data and the model was
good. This was conﬁrmed by the other ﬁt indices: goodness-of-ﬁt
index (GFI)=1.00, adjusted goodness-of-ﬁt index (AGFI)=.93, com-
parative ﬁt index (CFI)=1.00, normed ﬁt index (NFI)=1.00, and
root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA)=.078.1
As shown in Fig. 1, illegitimacy positively predicted each of the
anticipated group-based emotions. Anticipated group-based shame
and anger, in turn, positively predicted intentions to perform collective
action. The relationship between anticipated group-based guilt and
collective action was not signiﬁcant, implying that this emotion did
not uniquely predict protesting. Further analysis revealed that in the
fully saturated model anticipated group-based shame and anger pre-
dicted collective action, β=.42, pb .001 for shame and β=.30, pb .001
for anger, but that illegitimacy and anticipated group-based guilt were
non-signiﬁcant predictors, β=− .05, p=.573 for guilt and β=.10,1 Themodelﬁtwas improvedwhen the non-signiﬁcant pathwaybetween guilt and col-
lective actionwas removed.We alsomeasured group-based fear, anticipated group-based
anger in the Welsh, anticipated group-based anger in signiﬁcant others (Europeans), and
the participant's belief that the Welsh would retaliate. Anticipated group-based shame
and anger remained the strongest signiﬁcant predictors of collective action when these
variables were entered into the model. However, we did not include these variables in
the ﬁnal model in order to simplify the results.
Note. Figure contains standardized parameter estimates.
** = p < .01, and *** = p < .001.
Fig. 1. Model for the pathways to collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression (Study 1). **pb .01, and ***pb .001.
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between illegitimacy and collective actionwas signiﬁcant but the direct
pathway in the saturated model was non-signiﬁcant suggests that
anticipated group-based shame and anger fully mediated the relation-
ship between illegitimacy and collective action. Moreover, we tested
the signiﬁcance of the indirect pathways of illegitimacy to collective
action via the anticipated emotions using 95% bias-corrected conﬁdence
intervals, calculated using 5000 bootstrap resamples (see Preacher &
Hayes, 2004, 2008). This analysis was conducted in AMOS.2 There was
a signiﬁcant indirect pathway through anticipated group-based shame
(CI95=.01, .14, p=.010) and anger (CI95=.02, .15, p=.002). However,
the indirect pathway through anticipated group-based guilt was
non-signiﬁcant (CI95=− .01, .03, p=.588). The results reﬂect the fact
that anticipated group-based shame and anger (but not guilt)mediated
the relationship between illegitimacy and collective action.Alternative models. An alternative model assessed whether the antici-
pated group-based emotions predicted collective action via the ille-
gitimacy appraisal. We replaced the direct pathways between the
anticipated group-based emotions and collective action with an indi-
rect pathway through illegitimacy. The ﬁt indices suggested that this
model did not ﬁt the data well: χ2(3, N=179)=74.55, pb .001,
GFI=.88, AGFI=.40, CFI=.87, NFI=.87, and RMSEA=.366. The
model ﬁt for the hypothesized model was signiﬁcantly better than
this alternative model, χ2(2, N=179)=72.48, pb .001. The Akaike's
information criterion (AIC) was lower for the hypothesized model
(30.07) than for the alternative model (98.55), suggesting that the
original model was superior.
A second alternative model assessed whether the relationship be-
tween the illegitimacy appraisal and anticipated emotions was mediat-
ed by intentions to undertake collective action against a proposed
ingroup transgression. This model also did not ﬁt the data well: χ2(3,
N=179)=36.64, pb .001, GFI=.93, AGFI=.65, CFI=.94, NFI=.94,
and RMSEA=.251. The hypothesizedmodel ﬁtted the data signiﬁcantly
better than this alternative model, χ2(2, N=179)=34.57, pb .001. The
AIC for this model (60.64) was lower than that of the hypothesized
model, suggesting that the latter was superior.2 By default, AMOS calculates the total signiﬁcance of all indirect pathways. In order
to assess each pathway separately, we constrained the relationship of illegitimacy to
the anticipated emotions on the opposing pathways to zero. Further analysis suggested
that there was no suppression in the model, making this an appropriate method to an-
alyze these data.Discussion
In Study 1 we found that anticipated group-based guilt, shame and
anger were distinguishable constructs and that appraising a future
ingroup action as illegitimate positively predicted these three anticipat-
ed emotions. Moreover, anticipated group-based shame and anger (but
not guilt) positively predicted collective action against a proposed
ingroup transgression and mediated the relationship between illegiti-
macy and collective action. These results extend the intergroup litera-
ture by showing that anticipated group-based guilt, shame and anger
are experiencedwhen people appraise a future ingroup action as illegit-
imate, and that the anticipation of these aversive group-based emotions
is sufﬁcient to promote collective action against such actions.
A possible limitation of this study is that the participants were
English students studying in Wales. The close proximity between the
participants and the victimized outgroupmay have increased the likeli-
hood of the anticipated group-based emotions being evoked and
strengthened their relationship with collective action. A second limita-
tion is thatwe did notmeasure action tendencies associatedwith antic-
ipated group-based guilt. In line with previous research on directly
experienced emotions (Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006), we argue
that the low action potential and self-focused nature of anticipated
group-based guilt is more likely to promote less effortful action tenden-
cies (such as reparation) than collective action. This can be interpreted
as a ‘minimum effort’ defensive strategy, designed to alleviate any guilt
thatmay be experienced for the future actions of one's group. The aimof
Study 2 was to address these limitations and to replicate the ﬁndings of
Study 1.
Study 2
There were two differences between Studies 1 and 2. First, we al-
tered the intergroup context. At the time of planning Study 2, theUnited
Nations (UN) was debating how best to deal with Iran's alleged nuclear
weapons program. The then UK Foreign Secretary (David Miliband)
stated that he would not rule out the use of military force against Iran
if they did not start complying with UN sanctions. We used this context
because of the parallels with the invasion of Iraq and because of the dis-
tance between the perpetrating ingroup and victimized outgroup. Sec-
ond, we measured people's willingness to compensate the victimized
outgroup for any negative effects of the ingroup's actions.3 In line3 We also attempted to manipulate illegitimacy by informing participants that it
would be legitimate or illegitimate for Britain to use military force against Iran. How-
ever, this manipulation did not have a signiﬁcant effect on any of the dependent vari-
ables (p>.10), and is therefore not discussed further.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations between variables (Study 2).
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Illegitimacy 4.74 (1.98) –
2. Anticipated
group-based guilt
2.97 (1.99) .70⁎⁎⁎ –
3. Anticipated
group-based shame
3.31 (2.09) .74⁎⁎⁎ .85⁎⁎⁎ –
4. Anticipated
group-based anger
3.15 (2.26) .82⁎⁎⁎ .80⁎⁎⁎ .90⁎⁎⁎ –
5. Collective action 3.79 (2.31) .74⁎⁎⁎ .73⁎⁎⁎ .82⁎⁎⁎ .89⁎⁎⁎ –
6. Reparations 1.44 (0.26) .44⁎⁎⁎ .58⁎⁎⁎ .59⁎⁎⁎ .53⁎⁎⁎ .57⁎⁎⁎ –
Note. Table contains transformed reparation variable.
⁎⁎⁎ pb .001.
4 Because we were unable to enter the three anticipated emotions into the same
model, we were unable to determine the unique relationship of each anticipated emo-
tion to collective action and reparation. The relationships described below are there-
fore not independent.
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anger (but not guilt) would positively predict collective action against
an impending ingroup transgression. Moreover, based on previous
research (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2007),
we hypothesized that all three anticipated group-based emotions
would predict reparation intentions.
Method
Participants
A total of 186 participants (138 males and 48 females) completed
the online study. Participants were recruited through an advertisement
on a social networking website (Facebook). The age ranged from 18 to
64 years, with a mean age of 24.05. All participants were British
nationals.
Materials
Illegitimacy. Participants were asked to rate the extent of their agree-
ment with each of the following items: ‘It would be wrong/unjust/
legitimate (reversed)/morally acceptable (reversed) for the British to
bomb Iran's nuclear facilities’ (α=.93). These items were rated on a
7-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree).
Anticipated group-based emotions. The anticipated group-based shame,
guilt and anger terms were identical to those used in Study 1. All
three scales were reliable (αs=.91 for shame; .90 for guilt, and .96
for anger). Participants were asked: ‘If the British were to bomb Iran's
nuclear facilities to what extent would you feel [emotion word]?’ All
the items were rated on a 7-point scale (0=not at all, 6=extremely).
Collective action intentions. Intentions to engage in collective action
were assessed using three items: ‘I would like to participate in a dem-
onstration against Britain bombing Iran's nuclear facilities,’ ‘I would
like to participate in raising our collective voice to prevent Britain
from bombing Iran's nuclear facilities,’ and ‘I would like to do some-
thing with other British people to show our opposition to Britain
bombing Iran's nuclear facilities’ (α=.96). These items were rated
on a 7-point scale (1=not at all, 7=very much).
Reparation intentions. The desire to compensate Iranian people for any
negative consequences that the bombings might have was assessed
using the following 4 items (α=.83): ‘If Britain were to bomb Iran's
nuclear sites, resulting in civilian casualties, how willing would you
be to send aid to the victims/donate money to Iranian humanitarian
aid charities/sign a “book of apology”/support a government proposal
to send aid to the victims?’ All items were rated on a 7-point scale,
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).
Procedure
At the beginning of the session, participants were informed that the
study concerned their thoughts about the current situation in Iran.
Participants read a brief report summarizing Iran's alleged nuclear
missile program. This outlined the allegation that Iran was developing
nuclear weapons, and described the sanctions imposed on Iran by the
UN, together with Britain's stance on this issue. The report said that
the UK Foreign Secretary stated that he would not rule out the use of
military force against Iran. To make this more concrete, participants
were told that British forces might bomb Iran's nuclear facilities if
they did not start to complywith theUN. This informationwas followed
by a series of comprehension questions. The illegitimacy, anticipated
group-based emotion, collective action, and reparation measures were
then completed.Results
To correct for skew, we performed a logarithmic transformation on
the reparation variable prior to further analysis. The three anticipated
group-based emotions were highly correlated (see Table 3). A tolerance
value of .14 indicated that including all three emotions in a single
regression model would create multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2003;
Menard, 1995). To avoid multicollinearity, we analyzed the three antic-
ipated group-based emotions in separate models.
Structural equation modeling
We hypothesized that appraising a proposed ingroup transgression
as illegitimate would elicit anticipated group-based guilt, shame and
anger, and that shame and anger (but not guilt)would predict collective
action. We also hypothesized that all three anticipated group-based
emotions would predict reparation intentions. This model was assessed
using AMOS 19 software (Arbuckle, 2010). The model tests were based
on the covariance matrix and maximum likelihood estimation was
used. As noted above, the anticipated group-based emotions were ana-
lyzed in three separate models (see Fig. 2).4
Anticipated group-based shame. For the anticipated shame model
(Fig. 2a), the chi-squared value was non-signiﬁcant, χ2(1, N=186)b
0.01, p=.988, suggesting that the ﬁt between the data and the model
was good. This was conﬁrmed by other ﬁt indices: comparative ﬁt
index (CFI)=1.00, normed ﬁt index (NFI)=1.00, and root-mean-
square error of approximation (RMSEA)b .001. Illegitimacy positively
predicted anticipated group-based shame, which positively predicted
collective action and reparations. The indirect pathways from illegiti-
macy to collective action and reparation via shame were assessed
using 95% bias-corrected conﬁdence intervals, calculated using 5000
bootstrap resamples. The conﬁdence intervals for the indirect pathways
to collective action and reparation did not include zero (CI95=.30, .59
and CI95=.34, .53, respectively), indicating that both indirect pathways
were signiﬁcant (pb .001 for collective action, and pb .001 for repara-
tion). These results suggest that anticipated group-based shame medi-
ates the relationship of illegitimacy to collective action and reparation
either partially or fully, respectively.
Anticipated group-based anger. The anticipated anger model (Fig. 2b)
ﬁtted the data well: χ2(1, N=186)=0.01, p=.930, CFI=1.00,
NFI=1.00, and RMSEAb .001. Illegitimacy positively predicted antici-
pated group-based anger, which, in turn, predicted collective action
and reparation. Moreover, in contrast to the other anticipated emo-
tions, the direct pathway from illegitimacy to collective action was
non-signiﬁcant. The 95% bias-corrected conﬁdence intervals revealed
Note. Figure contains standardized parameter estimates.




Fig. 2. Model for the pathways to collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression and reparations (Study 2). Note. Figure contains standardized parameter estimates.
*pb .05, and ***pb .001.
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reparation (via anger) were signiﬁcant (CI95=.61, .80, pb .001, and
CI95=.33, .53, pb .001, respectively). This suggests that anticipated
group-based anger mediates the relationship of illegitimacy to collec-
tive action and reparation.
Anticipated group-based guilt. The anticipated group-based guilt
model (Fig. 2c) ﬁtted the data well: χ2(1, N=186)=0.50, p=.478,
CFI=1.00, NFI=1.00, and RMSEAb .001. Illegitimacy predicted antic-
ipated group-based guilt, which, in turn, predicted collective action
and reparation.5 The 95% bias-corrected conﬁdence intervals revealed5 These paths should be interpreted with caution because the predictive power of
each emotion is not independent. Indeed, the relationship between guilt and collective
action became non-signiﬁcant when either shame or anger was entered into this mod-
el (β=.07, p=.342 when controlling for shame, and β=.07, p=.210 when controlling
for anger). Moreover, in these models both shame and anger predicted collective ac-
tion (β=.54, pb .001 and β=.80, pb .001, respectively). The indirect pathway from il-
legitimacy to collective action via guilt also became non-signiﬁcant when controlling
for shame or anger (CI95=− .01, .07, p=.218 and CI95=− .01, .07, p=.193, respec-
tively). Importantly, multicollinearity was not an issue in any of these analyses (lowest
tolerance value=.23).that the indirect pathways from illegitimacy to collective action and
reparation (via guilt) were signiﬁcant (CI95=.19, .43, pb .001, and
CI95=.31, .49, pb .001, respectively). However, the indirect pathway
from illegitimacy to collective action via guilt should be interpreted
with caution because this indirect effect was non-signiﬁcant when
shame or anger were entered into the model (see Footnote 5).
Alternative model
Because of the high correlations between the anticipated emotions,
the alternative model assessed whether the relationship between ille-
gitimacy and collective action was mediated by a latent generalized
negative affect variable. It should be noted that thismodel had addition-
al variables to those outlined above and could therefore not be
contrasted with these models. However, we assessed this alternative
model to determine how well it ﬁtted the data. In this model the
three anticipated emotions were observed indicators of a latent gener-
alized negative affect variable. All other pathways were identical to the
hypothesized model. The chi-squared value was signiﬁcant, χ2(7, N=
186)=46.80, pb .001, suggesting that the model did not ﬁt the data
well. This was conﬁrmed by the other ﬁt indices. The CFI (.96) and NFI
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model did not ﬁt the data well.
Discussion
In line with the results of Study 1, we found that illegitimacy signif-
icantly predicted all three anticipated emotions, and that anticipated
group-based shame and anger positively predicted collective action
against a proposed ingroup transgression. Moreover, the relation
between illegitimacy and collective actionwasmediated by anticipated
group-based anger and partially mediated by anticipated group-based
shame. Contrary to Study 1, we found that anticipated group-based
guilt predicted collective action, and that the relationship between
illegitimacy and collective action was partially mediated by anticipated
group-based guilt. This was most likely due to the shared variance
between guilt, shame and anger. Indeed, the relationship between
guilt and collective action and the indirect pathway via guilt became
non-signiﬁcant once shame or anger was entered into this model (see
Footnote 5), consistent with the ﬁndings of Study 1.We also found
that all three anticipated group-based emotions positively predicted
reparation intentions.
A technical problem in the present study was the multicollinearity.
Further analysis revealed that this was due to a high correlation
between anticipated group-based shame and anger (see Footnote 5).
Associations between shame and anger are well documented in the
interpersonal (Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1988; Stuewig et al., 2010) and
intergroup (Iyer et al., 2007) literature. In the present research we
believe that it reﬂected the fact that groupmembers anticipated feeling
angry if the transgression were to be undertaken because it posed a
threat to social identity. A question that needs to be addressed is why
this multicollinearity was not evident in Study 1. In Study 2 we
recruited participants through an advertisement on a social networking
site. Unlike the undergraduate students in Study 1, these people are
likely to sign up to the study based on their interest in the issue under
investigation. These participants were likely to have a strong opinion
about Iran, resulting in more polarized responses. This polarized
response may have reduced variability in the dataset, increasing the
likelihood of multicollinearity. This may also explain why our attempt
to manipulate (il)legitimacy was not successful (see Footnote 3):
those signing up were already likely to have established views on the
legitimacy or otherwise of any intervention in Iran.
The results of Studies 1 and 2 provide support for the idea that
anticipated group-based emotions promote collective action. A logical
next step is to determine the factors that inﬂuence anticipated group-
based emotions. People's willingness to accept negative information
about their group is dependent on their level of ingroup identiﬁcation
(Branscombe et al., 1999; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead,
2006; Doosje et al., 1998). Leach et al. (2008) suggest that identiﬁcation
consists of two superordinate components: self-investment, deﬁned as
the value and emotional signiﬁcance attached to the ingroup, as well
as the importance and salience of this membership; and self-deﬁnition,
deﬁned as the perception of commonality and similarity within the
ingroup and between group members. In positive circumstances, high
self-investment in a group is rewarding. However, in negative circum-
stances greater investment in a group results inmore negative affective
consequences. Because of this, people with high self-investment are
typicallymotivated to reafﬁrm a positive ingroup identity and are likely
to legitimize negative ingroup actions in order to protect their group
and avoid aversive group-based emotions (Doosje et al., 1998; Leach
et al., 2008; Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Roccas,
Klar, & Liviatan, 2006). Unlike self-investment, self-deﬁnition is not
directly related to the desire to maintain a positive ingroup identity.
As stated earlier, the anticipation of negative group-based emotions
signals that a proposed ingroup action poses a threat to social identity.
People with high self-investment are likely to justify an ingroup trans-
gression in order to protect social identity. As a result, such peopleshould anticipate negative group-based emotions to a lesser extent
and thus be less willing to engage in collective action against the trans-
gression. People with low self-investment, on the other hand, are less
motivated to protect social identity by justifying a proposed ingroup
transgression and are more likely to implement prosocial strategies to
protect their small (but signiﬁcant) investment in the ingroup (Doosje
et al., 1998, 2006). By contrast, people with high self-deﬁnition are
unlikely to justify the ingroup's actions because this component of iden-
tiﬁcation is not directly related to the desire tomaintain a positive social
identity. These hypotheses were tested in Study 3.
A possible limitation of Studies 1 and 2 is that we focused on nega-
tive anticipated emotions. It may be possible that anticipating positive
emotions for the proposed ingroup transgression would inhibit collec-
tive action against the transgression. Group members may experience
positive emotions in relation to negative actions directed towards an
outgroup when this group is believed to pose a threat to the ingroup
(Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Leach et al., 2002). In such circumstances
people are likely to justify negative actions in order to eradicate the
potential threat. This justiﬁcationmay result in ingroupmembers antic-
ipating positive emotions for undertaking future transgressions
(Maitner et al., 2007). For example, the allegation that Iran possesses
nuclear weapons could be seen as a threat to the Western world.
Ingroup members may justify military intervention by suggesting that
Iran threatened world peace. The use of military force, therefore,
becomes justiﬁed because it serves a moral function. This might lead
some people to anticipate positive group-based emotions for undertak-
ing this strategy, making people less likely to protests against such
actions.
Study 3
Study 3 differed from Study 2 in three respects. First, we measured
ingroup identiﬁcation using the Leach et al. (2008) measure. Second,
we investigated the role of positive anticipated group-based emotions
on collective action. Three positive emotions were measured in this
study: pride, relief and feeling emboldened. The positive arousal that
is feeling emboldened arises when people believe that they are superior
to and have control over another party. This emotion may be more rel-
evant than pride in the present context because it is related to ingroup
superiority. Third,we directlymanipulated the anticipated group-based
emotions. Previous research has manipulated anticipated emotions
using the ‘mere measurement effect’ (O'Carroll, Dryden, Hamilton-
Barclay, & Ferguson, 2011; O'Carroll, Foster, McGeechan, Sandford, &
Ferguson, 2011; Richard et al., 1996; Sandberg & Conner, 2009). The
idea is that simply asking people to state the extent towhich they antic-
ipate a speciﬁc emotion for undertaking an action increases the salience
of this anticipated emotion in the decisionmaking process and the like-
lihood of it affecting subsequent behavior. We refer to this as a salience
manipulation. In the emotion salient condition, participants rated the
extent to which they would feel the anticipated group-based emotions
following the proposed ingroup transgression before stating their
willingness to engage in collective action. In the control condition, the
anticipated emotions were rated after participants stated their willing-
ness to engage in collective action. In the emotion salient condition
the anticipated emotions should be more prominent when deciding
whether to undertake collective action against the impeding transgres-
sion and have a greater effect on subsequent behavior than in the
control condition.
We also manipulated the valence of the anticipated group-based
emotions by asking participants to rate the extent to which they antic-
ipated either positive or negative group-based emotions for the ingroup
transgression. Positive anticipated group-based emotions signal that an
action is likely to result in positive emotions. Therefore, when partici-
pants rate the extent to which they anticipate positive anticipated
group-based emotions for the use of military force against Iran, they
are likely to incorporate the positive emotional consequences of this
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vasion. The desire to experience these positive consequences is likely to
stop group members from protesting against such action, because such
a protest might reduce the likelihood of the invasion occurring, along
with its positive emotional consequences. Increasing the salience of
positive anticipated group-based emotions should therefore decrease
the likelihood of group members undertaking collective action against
the invasion of Iran. Both people with high and low self-investment
are presumably motivated to experience these positive emotions. As a
result, the reduction in collective action should not be dependent on
self-investment.
The effect of increasing the salience of negative anticipated
group-based emotions on collective action is likely to be more complex
because this effect is likely to be dependent on the ingroup member's
level of self-investment. People with high self-investment are likely to
legitimize ingroup transgressions in order to protect social identity
(Leach et al., 2008). Therefore, when negative anticipated group-
based emotions are salient, people with high (but not low) self-
investment should be inclined to justify the ingroup transgression in
order to avoid social identity threats and these self-critical emotions.
This justiﬁcation is likely to inhibit anticipated group-based guilt,
shame and anger, thus creating a negative relationship between self-
investment and the aversive anticipated emotions. Studies 1 and 2
demonstrate that anticipated group-based shame and anger promote
collective action. By justifying the transgression, people with high self-
investment are less likely to anticipate these emotions, thereby reduc-
ing the likelihood that they will undertake collective action against
this transgression.
Previous research on self-critical group-based emotions has shown
that people with low identiﬁcation are more likely than high identiﬁers
to undertake action (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998, 2006). Although people
with low self-investment have less riding on the valence of the
ingroup's identity, they are still motivated to protect their small (but
signiﬁcant) investment in the ingroup, or to atone for, rather than justi-
fy its negative actions. The main difference between people with low
and high self-investment is thus that low investors are more likely to
implement strategies such as collective action and less likely to justify
ingroup behavior (Leach et al., 2008). The salience of the negative antic-
ipated emotions is therefore unlikely to reduce the extent of collective
action undertaken by people with low self-investment. Because people
with high (but not low) self-investment are likely to justify the trans-
gression, there should be a negative relationship between self-
investment and collective action when the negative anticipated emo-
tions are salient. When the negative anticipated group-based emotions
are not salient, the proposed transgression is less threatening, because
negative anticipated group-based emotions have not signaled the aver-
sive emotional consequences of military action and the social identity
threat that it poses. People with high self-investment should therefore
be less likely to justify the transgression. As a result, it should not be
the case that self-investment negatively predicts the aversive anticipat-
ed emotions and collective action. Furthermore, because self-deﬁnition
is unrelated to the desire to maintain a positive social identity, we




A total of 128 undergraduate students (11 males and 117 females)
participated in this study in exchange for course credit. Participants'
ages ranged from 18 to 33 years, with a mean age of 19.47. A 2
(salience: salient vs. control)×2 (valence: positive vs. negative)×
continuous moderating variable (self-investment or self-deﬁnition)
between-subjects factorial design was used. In the positive valence
conditionparticipants rated the extent towhich they anticipated feeling
positive group-based emotions (pride, feeling emboldened, and relief)if Britain were to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities. In the negative valence
condition participants rated the extent to which they anticipated nega-
tive group-based emotions (guilt, shame, and anger) if thiswere to hap-
pen. In the salient condition the anticipated emotion ratings were
measured before collective action intentions. In the control condition
the anticipated emotions were measured after collective action. Partic-
ipants were randomly assigned to conditions. The dependent variable
was the participant's willingness to engage in collective action.
Materials
Ingroup identiﬁcation. In the Leach et al. (2008) 14-item scale,
self-investment is assessed using 10 items, such as ‘Being British is an
important part of how I see myself’ and ‘I am glad to be British’ (α=
.93); and self-deﬁnition is assessed using 4 items (e.g. ‘I am similar to
the average British person,’ and ‘British people have a lot in common
with each other;’ α=.85). All items were rated on a 7-point Likert
scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree).
Anticipated group-based emotions, collective action and reparation. A
new item was added to each of the negative emotion scales, to in-
crease the strength of the manipulation. The additional guilt, shame
and anger items were ‘sorry,’ ‘humiliated,’ and ‘furious,’ respectively.
All three scales were reliable (αs=.87 for guilt; .87 for shame, and .88
for anger). The pride items were ‘proud,’ ‘triumphant,’ ‘victorious,’ and
‘jubilant’ (α=.89). The relief itemswere ‘relaxed,’ ‘relieved,’ ‘reassured,’
and ‘secure’ (α=.89). Feeling emboldened was assessed by ‘bold,’ ‘su-
perior,’ ‘fearless,’ and ‘powerful’ (α=.83). Participants were asked: ‘If
the British were to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities to what extent would
you feel [emotion word]?’ These items were assessed on a 7-point
scale (0=not at all, 6=extremely intensely). The collective action and
reparation measures were identical to those used in Study 2.
Procedure
After consent had been given, participants completed the identiﬁ-
cation scale. This was followed by the information about Iran's alleged
nuclear missile program. This described Iran's deﬁance of UN sanc-
tions and their alleged tests of nuclear weapons. It concluded by stat-
ing that the British government has said that it would not rule out the
use of military force against Iran if it did not start to comply with UN
sanctions. Participants were informed that Britain might bomb Iran's
nuclear facilities if they did not start to cooperate with the UN. A se-
ries of comprehension questions were then completed to ensure
that the participant had understood this information.
In the salient conditions the anticipated group-based emotion
measure was then completed. In the positive emotion salient condi-
tion the positive emotion scales were completed. In the negative
emotion salient condition the negative emotion scales were complet-
ed. The collective action and reparation intention scales were then
completed. In the control conditions these latter scales were rated be-
fore the anticipated emotion measures. When all measures had been
completed participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results
Removing three participantswho answeredmore than half the com-
prehension questions incorrectly did not substantially alter the results,
so their data were retained. To correct for positive skew, a square-root,
reciprocal, and logarithmic transformation was performed on the relief,
pride, and feeling emboldened variables, respectively, prior to further
analysis. To correct for negative skew, a square-root transformation was
performed on the self-investment variable before further analysis. Two
2 (salience: salient vs. control)×2 (valence: negative vs. positive)×
continuous identiﬁcation measure (self-investment or self-deﬁnition,
centered) ANOVAs were performed on collective action, one for each
identiﬁcation measure.
7 Simple effects analysis revealed that people with high self-deﬁnition (M+1SD)
were less likely to engage in collective action when the emotions were salient
(M=2.60, SE=0.25) than in the control condition (M=3.74, SE=0.24), F(1,
119)=5.38, p=.022, ηp2=.04. We also found that the salience by self-deﬁnition inter-
action had a signiﬁcant effect on anticipated group-based anger, F(1, 59)=6.16,
p=.016, ηp2=.10. People with high self-deﬁnition anticipated anger to a lesser extent
in the salient condition (M=3.30, SE=0.28) than in the control condition (M=4.02,
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Collective action. There was a signiﬁcant main effect of salience, F(1,
120)=9.81, p=.002, ηp2=.08. The main effect of valence was not
signiﬁcant, F(1, 120)=0.72, p=.399, ηp2=.01. Self-investment did
not predict collective action, F(1, 120)=1.10, p=.296, ηp2=.01. The
valence by self-investment interaction was marginally signiﬁcant, F(1,
120)=3.44, p=.066, ηp2=.03. These results were qualiﬁed by a signif-
icant three-way interaction between salience, valence and self-
investment, F(1, 120)=4.36, p=.039, ηp2=.04.6 Simple slopes analysis
revealed that this signiﬁcant interaction was due to a negative relation-
ship between self-investment and collective action when the negative
emotions were highly salient, β=− .50, t(120)=2.85, p=.005 (see
Fig. 3). All other slopes were non-signiﬁcant (ps>.10).
As can be seen in Fig. 3, people with high self-investment were
less willing to engage in collective action when the negative emotions
were salient than in any of the other conditions. Indeed, a comparison
of the estimated means revealed that people with high (M+1SD)
self-investment were less likely to support collective action when
negative emotions were salient (M=2.14, SE=0.31) than (1) when
they were not (M=3.49, SE=0.39), F(1, 120)=7.34, p=.008, ηp2=
.06 and (2) when positive emotions were salient (M=3.23, SE=
0.34), F(1, 120)=5.82, p=.017, ηp2=.05.
We hypothesized that people would be less likely to support
collective actions when positive emotions were salient. Simple effects
analysis also revealed that people with low self-investment (M−1SD)
were less likely to support collective action when positive emotions
were salient (M=2.73, SE=0.32) than when they were not (M=
3.77, SE=0.31), F(1, 120)=5.48, p=.021, ηp2=.04. Although people
with high self-investment were also less likely to support collective
action when positive emotions were salient (M=3.23, SE=0.34) than
when they were not (M=3.64, SE=0.28), this difference was non-
signiﬁcant, F(1, 120)=0.89, p=.347, ηp2=.01.
Negative anticipated group-based emotions. Anticipated group-based
guilt, shame and anger were only rated in the negative valence condi-
tion. Participants in the positive valence conditions were therefore not
included in these analyses and valence was not a factor. Themain effect
of salience on anger was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 60)=0.18, p=.674,
ηp2b .01. Self-investment negatively predicted anger, F(1, 60)=11.52,
p=.001, ηp2=.16, (β=− .38, p=.001). This was qualiﬁed by a signiﬁ-
cant interaction between salience and self-investment, F(1, 60)=7.69,
p=.007, ηp2=.11. Simple slopes analysis revealed that self-investment
negatively predicted anticipated group-based anger in the salient con-
dition, β=− .69, t(60)=4.67, pb .001, but not in the control condition,
β=− .07, t(60)=0.41, p=.680. As shown in Fig. 4a, people with low
(M−1SD) self-investment anticipated group-based anger to a greater
extent in the salient condition (M=4.48, SE=0.31) than in the control
condition (M=3.71, SE=0.28), F(1, 60)=3.42, p=.069, ηp2=.05.
Moreover, simple effects analysis revealed that people with high
(M+1SD) self-investment anticipated less group-based anger in the sa-
lient condition (M=2.49, SE=0.28) than in the control condition (M=
3.50, SE=0.36), F(1, 60)=5.09, p=.028, ηp2=.08.
Salience did not have a signiﬁcant main effect on shame, F(1, 60)=
1.53, p=.222, ηp2=.03. Self-investment negatively predicted shame,
F(1, 60)=13.40, p=.001, ηp2=.18, (β=− .41, p=.001). Thiswas qual-
iﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction between salience and self-investment,
F(1, 60)=4.40, p=.040, ηp2=.07. Simple slopes analysis revealed that
self-investment negatively predicted shame in the salient condition,
β=− .65, t(60)=4.36, pb .001, but not the control condition, β=
− .18, t(60)=1.04, p=.303. As shown in Fig. 4b, people with high
(but not low) self-investment anticipated group-based shame to a
lesser extent in the salient condition (M=2.48, SE=0.28) than in6 Further analysis revealed that this effect was due to the satisfaction and centrality
subcomponents of self-investment, thereby supporting Leach et al. (2008).the control condition (M=3.52, SE=0.36), F(1,60)=5.28, p=
.025, ηp2=.08.
The main effect of salience on guilt was non-signiﬁcant, F(1, 60)=
1.87, p=.176, ηp2=.03. Self-investment did not signiﬁcantly predict
guilt, F(1, 60)=2.47, p=.122, ηp2=.04. There was a near-signiﬁcant
interaction between salience and self-investment, F(1, 60)=4.01,
p=.050, ηp2=.06. Self-investment negatively predicted guilt in the
salient condition, β=− .44, t(60)=2.71, p=.009, but not the control
condition, β=.05, t(60)=0.29, p=.775. People with high (but not
low) self-investment anticipated group-based guilt to a lesser extent
in the salient condition (M=3.11, SE=0.30) than in the control con-
dition (M=4.22, SE=0.38), F(1, 60)=5.36, p=.024, ηp2=.08 (see
Fig. 4c).
Positive anticipated group-based emotions. Neither the main effect of
self-investment nor its interaction with salience had a signiﬁcant effect
on any of the positive anticipated group-based emotions (ps>.10).
Self-deﬁnition
The main effect of self-deﬁnition did not predict collective action,
F(1, 120)=1.35, p=.247, ηp2=.01. The interaction between salience
and self-deﬁnition had a marginally signiﬁcant effect on collective ac-
tion, F(1, 120)=2.98, p=.087, ηp2=.02.7 Therewas amarginally signif-
icant three-way interaction between salience, valence and self-
deﬁnition, F(1, 120)=2.82, p=.096, ηp2=.02. However, this interaction
became non-signiﬁcant when self-investment was entered into the
model as a covariate, F(1, 119)=2.66, p=.106, ηp2=.02. All other inter-
action effects on collective action were non-signiﬁcant (ps>.10).
Reparation intentions
There were no signiﬁcant main or interaction effects on reparation
intentions (ps>.10). Because positive emotions were only rated in the
positive valence condition and negative emotions were only rated in
the negative condition, two analyses were conducted, one regressing
reparation on positive anticipated emotions and the other regressing
reparation on negative anticipated emotions. Across the two analyses,
the only signiﬁcant predictor of reparation intentions was anticipated
group-based guilt, β=.49, p=.008.
Mediated moderation
We conductedmediatedmoderation analysis to determinewhether
the moderator (self-investment) affected the magnitude of the treat-
ment effect (emotion salience) on the mediators (negative anticipated
group-based emotions), which, in turn, predicted the outcome variable
(collective action). Moreover, this analysis was also used to determine
which negative anticipated group-based emotions were driving this
effect. This mediating process could only be assessed for the partici-
pants in the negative valence condition because this is where negative
emotions were measured. However, this is unproblematic because
this is the condition in which a reduction in collective action was
observed.
For participants in the negative valence condition, the effect of the
salience by self-investment interaction on collective action intentions
was marginally signiﬁcant, β=− .21, p=.075, thereby fulﬁlling the
ﬁrst criterion for moderated mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986;
Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). As reported above, the salience bySE=0.31), F(1, 59)=3.30, p=.074, ηp2=.05. Self-deﬁnition also had a signiﬁcant main
effect on guilt, F(1, 59)=5.01, p=.029, ηp2=.08, reﬂecting a positive relationship be-
tween these variables (β=.32, p=.029).
Note. ** = p < .010
Fig. 3. Interaction of salience, valence and self-investment on collective action (Study 3). Error bars=±1SE. Note. **pb .010.
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group-based emotions, fulﬁlling the second criterion for moderated
mediation. In keeping with Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005), theb)
c)
Note. ** = p < .01 and *** = p < .001.
a)
Fig. 4. Interaction of salience and self-investment on anticipated group-based a) anger,
b) shame, and c) guilt (Study 3). Note. **pb .01 and ***pb .001.main effects of salience, self-investment, and anticipated group-based
anger, shame, and guilt were entered into a regression equation. The
interactions of self-investment with the salience manipulation and the
three anticipated emotionswere also entered into this regression equa-
tion.8 In this analysis, the salience by self-investment interaction was a
non-signiﬁcant predictor of collective action, β=− .05, p=.715. Antic-
ipated group-based shame signiﬁcantly predicted collective action, β=
.48, p=.019. Anticipated group-based guilt and anger were non-
signiﬁcant predictors, β=− .11, p=.524 and β=.29, p=.132, respec-
tively. All remaining predictors were non-signiﬁcant (ps>.10). These
results provided initial support for our mediated moderation hypothe-
sis. Following Preacher et al. (2007), the signiﬁcance of this indirect
pathway was assessed using 95% bias-corrected conﬁdence intervals,
calculated using 5000 bootstrap resamples. This analysis assessed
whether the effect of the salience by self-investment interaction on col-
lective action was mediated by anticipated group-based shame. The
conﬁdence intervals did not include zero (CI95=− .50,− .02), demon-
strating a signiﬁcant indirect effect. These results reﬂect the fact that the
effect of the emotion salience by self-investment interaction on collec-
tive action is mediated by anticipated group-based shame.Discussion
In Study 3 we found that participants with high self-investment
were less willing to engage in collective action in the negative emotion
salience than in the control condition because they anticipated lower
levels of group-based shame for undertaking the proposed transgres-
sion. Based on Studies 1 and 2, we hypothesized that this effect would
also be mediated by anticipated anger. This was not the case, although
it is worth noting that the effect of anger approached signiﬁcance. We
also hypothesized that people with low self-investment would exhibit
greater levels of collective action when the negative emotions were
salient than when they were not salient. In Study 3 this difference was
non-signiﬁcant. Previous research has found that low identiﬁers only
undertake collective action when group efﬁcacy is high (Van Zomeren
et al., 2008). Because the participants were not informed about group
efﬁcacy, people with low self-investment may have been reluctant to
undertake collective action when the negative emotions were salient.
In Study 3 we also investigated the effects of positive anticipated
group-based emotions on collective action. We hypothesized that
when positive anticipated group-based emotions were salient people
would inhibit collective action, regardless of their level of self-8 The main effects and interactions of all the anticipated group-based emotions were
entered into the regression equation to determine which emotion uniquely predicted
collective action intentions. The salience by self-investment interaction still had a
non-signiﬁcant effect on collective action intentions when the anticipated group-
based guilt and anger main effects and interactions were removed from the equation.
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self-investment. These participants did show a reduction in collective
action when the positive anticipated group-based emotions were
salient, compared to the control condition, providing some support for
our hypothesis. Although people with high self-investment were also
less willing to undertake collective action in the positive emotion salient
than the control condition, this difference was non-signiﬁcant.
General discussion
The aim of this researchwas to determinewhether anticipating that
an ingroup transgression would evoke aversive group-based emotions
motivates group members to perform collective action to stop the
transgression. In Study 1 we found that anticipated group-based
shame and anger (but not guilt) positively predicted collective action
against a proposed ingroup transgression andmediated the relationship
between illegitimacy and collective action. Study 2 supported these
results by ﬁnding that anticipated group-based shame and anger posi-
tively predicted collective action, and that shame (partially) and anger
(fully) mediated the relationship between illegitimacy and collective
action. Although Study 2 revealed a positive relationship between antic-
ipated group-based guilt and collective action, further analysis revealed
that guilt did not predict collective action taking either shame or anger
into account (see Footnote 5). Moreover, in Studies 2 and 3 we found
that anticipated group-based guilt predicted reparation for anynegative
consequences of the ingroup's actions. Previous research has found that
group members sometimes use reparation to enhance social identity
after experiencing group-based shame (Brown & Cehajic, 2008;
Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2012). In Study 3, the fact that antic-
ipated group-based shame predicted collective action when another,
less effortful afﬁrmation strategy (reparation) was available implies
that group members are motivated to undertake actions that prevent
the identity-threatening situation rather than actions that may be
used to repair one's identity at a later date.
In Study 3we assessedwhether participants high in self-investment
would try to justify a future ingroup transgressionwhen negative antic-
ipated group-based emotions were salient, the aim of this justiﬁcation
being to protect the ingroup's identity. We found that participants
with high self-investment exhibited reduced collective action inten-
tions when negative anticipated group-based emotions were salient,
compared to the control condition. This effect was mediated by antici-
pated group-based shame. This ﬁnding contrastswith the results of pre-
vious research inwhich itwas found that people high in self-investment
were most likely to exhibit prosocial behavior when they anticipated
experiencing aversive group-based emotions for transgressions, in this
case ingroup favoritism (Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2012a). How-
ever, it should be noted that research has found that anticipated
group-based shame is most likely to inhibit transgressions when the
ingroup's status is high and secure (Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead,
2012b). In the present study, the threat posed by Iran's alleged nuclear
weapons program may have motivated people with high self-
investment to legitimize harmful actions in order to dealwith the threat
posed by the outgroup. This suggests that aversive anticipated
group-based emotions are most likely to promote collective action
against an impending transgression in less threatening circumstances.
We also hypothesized that the anticipation of positive group-based
emotions would reduce participants' willingness to engage in collective
action. In Study 3 we found that the anticipation of positive group-
based emotions reduced collective action intentions in participants
who were low in self-investment. Participants high in self-investment
did exhibit a (non-signiﬁcant) reduction in collective action when pos-
itive anticipated group-based emotions were salient.
Since the inception of intergroup emotion theory (Smith, 1993)
there has been a growing interest in the motivational role of group-
based emotions on collective action. Initially, this research focused on
the role of group-based anger in motivating disadvantaged groupmembers to perform collective action (Livingstone et al., 2009; Van
Zomeren et al., 2004, 2008). Moreover, recent research has found that
advantaged groups undertake collective action on the behalf of a disad-
vantaged groupwhen they feel angry at the ingroup (Leach et al., 2006),
sympathy towards the outgroup (Iyer & Ryan, 2009), or ashamed of
their own group's actions (Iyer et al., 2007). To date, this literature has
focused on the effect of directly experienced emotions on collective
action. The present study extends this research by demonstrating that
the anticipation of group-based emotions predicts people's willingness
to undertake collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression.
This research suggests that emotions do not need to be experienced in
situ for them to affect the behavior of group members. The anticipation
of an identity-threatening group-based emotion is sufﬁcient to promote
collective action.
As noted earlier, recent research has demonstrated thatmorality is a
key aspect of ingroup identity (Ellemers et al., 2008; Leach et al., 2007;
Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011; Scheepers et al., 2009). Recently,
Pagliaro et al. (2011) found that the effect of moral norms on group
members' behavior was mediated by the anticipation of receiving
respect from fellow group members, thereby suggesting that other-
praising group-based emotions promote moral conduct. Although
other-praising emotions are likely to inﬂuence moral conduct, a
self-regulatory system is also required, otherwise “people would
behave like weather vanes, constantly shifting direction to conform to
whatever inﬂuence happened to impinge upon them” (Bandura, 2001,
p. 7). Essentially, without a self-regulatory system people's behavior
would be solely dependent on the perceived moral values of the
group members that are present at a given time. We therefore extend
the work of Pagliaro and colleagues by outlining a self-regulatory sys-
tem for promotingmoral intergroup behavior. In linewith the interper-
sonal literature (Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001,
2007), we argue that anticipated group-based emotions help ingroup
members to maintain a moral identity by signaling the aversive emo-
tional consequences of proposed transgressions. This approach can be
interpreted as a form of self- or ingroup-policing. The anticipation of
these emotions warns ingroup members that the proposed actions of
their group are immoral, which in turn motivates collective action to
prevent the transgression and therebymaintain a moral group identity.
A growing body of research has investigated the role of positive
group-based emotions in promoting non-egalitarian and aggressive
ingroup actions. This research has found that group-based pride pro-
motes ingroup bias (Harth et al., 2008), and that experiencing
group-based satisfaction toward an aggressive ingroup action posi-
tively predicts support for future transgressions (Maitner et al.,
2007). We extend this research by demonstrating that anticipating
positive group-based emotions for a future ingroup transgression
decreases the likelihood of ingroupmembers undertaking collective ac-
tion against this behavior. This is not to say that positive group-based
emotions always promote non-egalitarian and immoral intergroup
behavior. Leach et al. (2007) found that group members experience
pridewhen their group has amoral social identity.We believe that peo-
ple may also anticipate group-based pride for egalitarian and prosocial
behaviors, and that this may also promote moral intergroup actions.
Further research is needed to investigate the effect of positive group-
based emotions on moral intergroup behavior.
Haidt and colleagues (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt & Graham, 2007)
suggest that ﬁve psychological systems provide the foundations of
morality: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/
respect, and purity/sanctity. In the present research we focusedmainly
on the role of anticipated group-based emotions in promoting egalitar-
ian behavior (Study 1) and deterring harmful ingroup actions (Studies 2
and 3). This work may therefore be criticized for focusing primarily
on the role of anticipated group-based emotions in promoting moral
behavior relevant to the harm/care and fairness/reciprocity dimensions.
However, we argue that these anticipated emotions are more relevant
to fairness and care than to the other three dimensions. Group loyalty
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anticipated group-based emotions. Similarly, although there may be an
element of anticipated group-based guilt, anger and shame that pro-
motes purity/sanctity, disgust is more characteristic in this domain
(Cannon, Schnall, & White, 2011; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Rozin, Lowery,
Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Finally, in other research we have found that
anticipated group-based guilt and shame did not affect a low-status
group's discrimination against a high-status group (Shepherd et al.,
2012b), suggesting that these emotions are unlikely to promote moral
behavior in the authority/hierarchy domain. On the other hand, the
fact that shame did down-regulate discrimination among those who
already have high status suggests that it can foster more equal social
relations.
Our results contrast with work by Tangney and colleagues (Dearing,
Stuewig, & Tangney, 2005; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al.,
2007) suggesting that moral behavior is more likely to be guided by
guilt than shame. As noted earlier, recent research has found that
shame can promote prosocial behavior (De Hooge et al., 2008, 2010),
and that guilt has a ‘dark side’ (Bastian, Jetten, & Fasoli, 2011; De
Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2011; Nelissen &
Zeelenberg, 2009). One reason why Tangney and colleagues did not
ﬁnd a link between shame and prosocial behavior may be that they
measured the participant's proneness to this emotion rather than the
emotion itself (De Hooge et al., 2008) or its anticipated form as in the
present research. In keeping with this idea, Tibbetts (1997) found that
shame-proneness was positively associated with deviant behavior but
that anticipated shame negatively predicted this action. Based on
Tibbetts (1997) and recent research (e.g., De Hooge et al., 2008;
Gausel & Leach, 2011), we argue that shame can promote moral behav-
ior. The ﬁndings of the present studies extend this work by suggesting
that (group-based) shame promotes moral intergroup behavior. It is
also likely that because there is a greater distance between the individ-
ual and the transgression for both anticipated and group-based emo-
tions, the identity threat posed by this action may be less harmful
than if the individual had committed the transgression. This may
make it less likely that people will implement defensive strategies in
order to avoid shame.
There is some debate in the literature concerning the classiﬁcation
of anticipated emotions. Frijda (2004) suggested that anticipated
emotions are predictive cognitions rather than emotions. However,
there is evidence beyond our research that anticipated emotions elicit
affective arousal. Imagery studies have found that imagining emotional
experiences alters physiological arousal (e.g., Sinha, Lovallo, & Parsons,
1992). Similarly, participants exhibited higher skin conductance
responses before undertaking a risky decision rather than a safe option
(Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996). In the latter study, the
presence of this arousal suggests that a) anticipated emotions signal
decisions that would be regretted, and b) these anticipated emotions
are associatedwith affective reactions. The affective nature of anticipat-
ed emotions suggests that they are (cognitively-based) emotions rather
than (or as well as) cognitions (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007).
It is worth considering the relationship between anticipated and
directly experienced group-based emotions. Directly experienced emo-
tions help to improve the accuracy of their anticipated counterpart
(Baumeister et al., 2007; Damasio, 1994). People experience aversive
moral emotions (such as guilt, shame, and self-directed anger) when
their behavior violates a moral standard. The fact that the emotion is
being experienced suggests that the anticipated emotions did not
deter the immoral behavior and that the accuracy of this system
needs to be improved. These directly experienced emotions become
associated with the immoral behavior. The next time the person is in
a situation in which this immoral action could be repeated, the antici-
pated emotion signals that this would result in aversive emotions. The
anticipated emotion thereby helps to prevent the immoral action from
being repeated. We believe that this process occurs at the intergroup
level. Experiencing group-based guilt, shame or anger suggests thatthe ingroup has done something immoral. The aversive consequences
of these directly experienced group-based emotions become associated
with immoral action. When ingroup members ﬁnd themselves in a po-
sition in which similar behavior could be enacted, anticipating these
aversive group-based emotions should deter the immoral behavior:
once bitten, twice shy. Put another way, those who do not learn from
history are condemned to repeat it.
Turning to possible limitations of the present research, it could be
argued that the observed effects are due to the anticipation of gener-
alized negative affect, rather than speciﬁc emotions. Anticipating that
the future actions of the ingroup would evoke negative arousal may
havemotivated ingroupmembers to undertake collective action against
the proposed transgression. There are two reasons for rejecting this al-
ternative explanation. First, in Study 2 the theoretical model in which
the emotions were observed indicators of a latent negative affect vari-
able did not ﬁt our data well. This suggests that it was the anticipation
of group-based emotions that predicted the action tendencies, rather
than more generic negative affect. Second, if the results were caused
by negative affect rather than the emotions, anticipated group-based
shame, anger and guilt should predict collective action. The fact that
the latter anticipated emotion consistently failed to uniquely predict
collective action suggests that negative affect is not driving this process.
It could also be argued that, prior to a transgression, ingroup mem-
bers may experience anger and shame at the hypocrisy of their leaders
and that these directly experienced emotions promote collective action,
rather than the anticipated emotions studied here. However we do
not believe that this argument can account for our ﬁndings, for two
reasons. First, although the salience of the anticipated emotions was
manipulated between conditions in Study 3, the salience of directly
experienced emotionswas constant. The fact thatwe found a signiﬁcant
difference suggests that anticipated emotions are more likely to pro-
mote collective action, or explain the difference between conditions
with respect to this outcome than the directly experienced emotions.
Second, recent research suggests that directly experienced emotions
can predict behavior indirectly through anticipated emotions (for a
review, see Baumeister et al., 2007; Brown &McConnell, 2011). Indeed,
a possibly legitimate criticism of the use of scenario studies in emotion
research is that they assess anticipated emotions, rather than those
directly experienced (although, as we argue, the net effect is likely to
be similar). This suggests that group-based anger and shame may
(at least partly) predict collective action through their anticipated coun-
terparts. For example, feeling angry that members of one's ingroup are
considering whether or not to perform a transgression may signal the
aversive emotional consequences of performing this action (‘If I am
angry that my group is considering this action; I am likely to be furious
if they actually implemented this plan’). This anger may therefore
predict collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression indi-
rectly, through its anticipated counterpart. Moreover, as noted earlier,
one reason why anticipated shame may be more predictive of preven-
tive collective action than the directly experienced form of this emotion
is that it may be less prone to the characteristic avoidant and distancing
responses of shame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007).
Because something can still be done to prevent the shameful event
from occurring, preventive rather than avoidant action tendencies
may be promoted for the anticipated form. Future research could com-
pare similar events that have taken place versus events that remain pre-
ventable to assess whether anticipated shame retains the positive
behavioral correlates of shame while avoiding the negative ones.
In line with previous research (Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006),
we argued that anticipated group-based guilt is unlikely to predict col-
lective action because the low action potential of guilt is insufﬁcient to
promote effortful behaviors. Moreover, anticipated group-based guilt
is more likely to predict less effortful action tendencies, such as repara-
tion. The results of the present studies supported these hypotheses.
However, it should be noted that although research has investigated
the low action potential of guilt at the interpersonal level (Frijda et al.,
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assessed the action potential of group-based guilt relative to other
emotions, such as group-based anger and shame. Intergroup emotion
theory postulates that the key difference between interpersonal and
intergroup emotions is the self (personal versus group-based) that pro-
vides a basis for appraising an event. Based on this rationale, group-
based guilt should have a similar action potential to its interpersonal
counterpart. However, further research is needed to substantiate this
claim.
In the present research the collective action items assessed partici-
pants' willingness to undertake an action at the present time, whereas
the reparation items asked participants to state their willingness to un-
dertake an action at some point in the future. Anticipated group-based
shame and anger predicted collective action, suggesting that these emo-
tions promote immediate action that rectiﬁes the situation. Anticipated
group-based guilt positively predicted engaging in future reparation.
Low action potential emotions (such as guilt) may be especially likely
to predict actions that take place in the future because the temporal
distance between the present and the future action reduces the amount
of effort that needs to be expended right now. Moreover, group mem-
bers may endorse such future actions in order to ‘cleanse their soul,’
thereby avoiding group-based guilt without actually doing anything.
In conclusion, the aim of this research was to determine whether
the anticipation of aversive group-based emotions would motivate
people to undertake collective action against a proposed ingroup
transgression. Anticipated group-based shame and anger (but not
guilt, see Footnote 5) predicted collective action in Studies 1 and 2.
In Study 3, peoplewith high self-investmentwere lesswilling to engage
in collective action when negative anticipated group-based emotions
were salient than they were in the control condition. This effect was
found to be mediated by anticipated group-based shame. These studies
extend the literature on collective action by showing that the anticipa-
tion of aversive group-based emotions can increase the likelihood of
collective protest. This is important because previous research consider-
ing group-based emotions as predictors of collective action has focused
on the presence of such emotions (e.g., anger) rather than their antici-
pated experience. Moreover, we extend recent developments in the
interpersonal emotion literature by demonstrating that shame can
serve to promote moral intergroup behavior.
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